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Anti-realism—the view that reality is merely a cultural construct and that one’s 
membership of a culture or a linguistic group slices and structures one’s reality—
exercised a huge impact on the humanities in the final decades of the twentieth 
century. More often than not, this impact had the unfortunate form of ideological, 
institutionally enforced, un-argued or poorly argued suppression of opposing views. 
We currently live in an epoch of gradual recovery from the excesses of that, 
intellectually remarkably barren and destructive, era; it is natural that one wants to 
test and re-examine positions that, until recently, have been ideologically 
suppressed. Ian Verstegen’s latest book is an effort to regain, in art history, the 
intellectual ground that was lost in recent decades. The impact of anti-realism in art 
history was more profound than in many other disciplines of the humanities. 
Arguably, in its sister discipline—architectural history—the impact of such views 
was meagre, possibly because the architectural academia provided an outlet for 
such perspectives in the form of work in architectural theory, where, indeed, the 
consequences were devastating. Nor did postmodernism in the philosophy of 
history make such radical anti-realist claims as it was the case in art history. 
Theorists such as Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit or Keith Jenkins did not deny 
reality itself and were prepared to accept that one could make individual true 
statements about it. Rather, their view was that connection with reality is lost once 
such statements are organised into narratives, because other forces (rhetoric, literary 
style, political agendas and so on) take over.1 In art history, however, much more 
radical positions were articulated, for instance by Norman Bryson, for whom reality 
itself was always historically produced.2 Also, Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art 
with its influential claim that realism in painting merely derives from cultural 
inculcation had significant impact on the understanding of the relationship between 
a visual representation and its object. It provided grounds for radical relativism that 
                                                        
1 Hayden White, Metahistory. Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1973, 6, note 5. Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking History, London: Routledge, 1991, 
40. However, Keith Jenkins in Refiguring history. New thoughts on an old discipline, London: Routledge, 
2004, 5, claims that ‘historians can just never get things right’. But he fails to explain whether this is a 
historical fact about historians that he has somehow got right.  For Frank Ankersmit, see for instance 
his Historical Representation, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, 13. He also takes very clear 
position in his debate with Heikki Saari, On Frank Ankersmit’s postmodernist theory of historical 
narrativity’, Rethinking History 9:1 (2005) 5-21, see the response by Frank Ankersmit, ‘Reply to Professor 
Saari’, Rethinking History 9:1 (2005) 23-33.  
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one could hardly attribute to a postmodernist philosopher of history such as 
Ankersmit.3  
Considering this radical anti-realist tone of postmodernism in art history, it 
is not surprising that Verstegen’s book concentrates on ontological problems. Anti-
realism and the relativism that it breeds are notorious for their anti-humanist 
potential. If there is no reality, then everything is relative; if everything is relative, 
then it becomes impossible to condemn any kind of oppression. ‘Ontology’, 
Verstegen rightly points out, ‘is not a philosophical pastime. It is the  ery basis of 
social emancipation’. (x ) The lack of consistency in ontological claims has indeed 
often been the weak side of the anti-realist camp: claims that reality is culturally 
constructed typically lea e the ontology of culture, or other ‘constructing’ forces, 
unexplained. What is, after all, this ‘culture’ that exists outside reality and makes us 
believe in reality? Is it real itself? Is the claim that all knowledge is culturally 
induced itself a piece of such culturally induced knowledge? Notoriously, a theorist 
or a historian who subscribes to relativist anti-realism can sustain the position only 
by attributing oneself a privileged cognitive position in the world and its world 
history. The Introduction to A Realist Theory of Art History provides an insightful and 
entertaining analysis of such self-exempting attitudes. It also makes an important 
point regarding the origins of anti-realism: while one tends to see postmodernists 
aligned with continental authors such as Derrida, analytic philosophers such as 
Willard van Orman Quine or Michael Dummett certainly made significant 
contributions, or in other words, carry much responsibility for what happened with 
scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s.4  
Verstegen’s discussion of ontology is largely based on critical realism and 
the works of Roy Bhasker. While the perspective Verstegen provides is an original 
contribution, on the initial reading the book may leave the wrong impression that it 
is merely an application of critical realism to the philosophy of art history. This is 
unfortunate, and combined with Verstegen’s tendency to make his presentations of 
arguments cryptic, it is likely to affect adversely the wider reception of the book. In 
other words, this is a book that states, but does not successfully promote, its 
author’s  iews, as those who are sympathetic to positions similar to Verstegen’s 
may have wanted. The reliance on critical realism means that from Verstegen’s 
                                                        
3 Nelson Goodman Languages of Art: an approach to a theory of symbols, Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., Indianapolis 1976. Ankersmit’s  iews are particularly interesting, because he embraces 
postmodernism while rejecting its radical relativist implications. See his exchange with Perez Zagorin, 
Frank Ankersmit, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism’, History and Theory, 28:1 (1989) 137-153. Perez 
Zagorin, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations’, History and Theory, 29:3 (1990), 263-
274. Frank Ankersmit, ‘Reply to Professor Zagorin’, History and Theory, 29:3 (1990), 275-296, esp. 278, 
note 7. See also the attack on Ankersmit in Peter Icke, Ankersmit’s Lost Historical Cause, New York: 
Routlage 2012. See also Adam Timmins re iew with the author’s response 
http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1245 accessed 1 September 2013. 
4 The idea to see in Quine an anti-realist may be surprising to many contemporary analytic 
philosophers. In support of Verstegen’s thesis one can cite Quine’s essay ‘The Problem of  eaning is 
Linguistics’: ‘…there is in principle no separating language from the rest of the world, at least as 
conceived by the speaker. Basic differences in languages are bound up, as likely as not, with 
differences in the way in which the speakers articulate the world itself into things and properties, time 
and space, elements, forces, spirits, and so on. It is not clear even that it makes sense to think of words 
and syntax as  arying from language to language while the content stays fixed…’ in Willard  an 
Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper, 1961, 47-64, 61.     ranko  itro i         A realist theory of art history 
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perspective the split between analytic and continental philosophy is largely 
irrelevant. The important theoretical distinction for critical realism is the one 
between so-called transitive and intransitive realms—that is, between ontology and 
epistemology. (19)  haskar used the term ‘epistemic fallacy’ for the tendency to 
mistake one’s obser able experience of processes for the underlying mechanism 
beyond sensible reach. The rejection of this fallacy enables critical realists to state 
that a scientist or a historian can form fallible theories without assuming that these 
theories touch the intransitive nature of their objects. (19) An implication of critical 
realism is also the rejection of the understanding of truth as consensus (as has been 
proposed by some scholars); rather, truth is an ontological relation of satisfaction 
that may or may not obtain in a given case. (39) It is also accepted that reality 
belongs not only to objects that exist independently of human mind, but to various 
cultural objects that require humans for their existence as well. (20) For the realist, 
says Verstegen, the causal criterion of existence is more important—that is, the view 
that things that have causal power are real. (This has important implications when it 
comes to deciding about the attribution of reality to different types of entities.) The 
stratification of the world that Bhasker proposed differentiates between mechanisms, 
events and experiences—they are all real, only events and experiences are actual 
and only experiences are empirical. (23) Realism thus described is a meta-theory; it 
says how the strata of reality are structured, but it does not tell us how to write 
history. (44) Critical realism also rejects the identification of explanation and 
prediction. Art historical objects are intransitively there, whether one studies them 
or not; since intransitive objects have a variety of properties that are actualised in 
different contexts, the result is relationism as opposed to relativism. (30-31) 
Verstegen also differentiates between facets and scales: facets refer to some 
individual parts that constitute a whole of an historical account (agriculture, 
warfare) while scales pertain to the relationship between the histories of parts and 
wider entities (the history of Tuscany versus the history of Italy). (33) The book also 
analyses a series of theoretical problems of art historiography from the position of 
critical realism: this includes for instance, various types of historiographical 
narratives, the speculative philosophy of history (41-47), style (67-69) and general 
and special history (51-72). Discussions of examples (Burckhardt, research on 
Duccio or Cara aggio) help elucidate some of Verstegen’s cryptic formulations in 
other parts of the book.  
The important problem that a project like cannot avoid pertains to the nature 
of the entities to which reality is attributed. Claims about robust ontology 
necessarily come pre-packaged with metaphysical dilemmas: agreeing that there are 
some things in Heaven and Earth, does not commit one to accepting that all things a 
language can name really are. The crucial dilemma is the boundary between what is 
really real and that which is not (or exists only as derivative of that which is real). 
Verstegen introduces the problem by obser ing that ‘one must not construe the only 
bona fide objects to be physical objects’. (36) Institutions, unitary e ents and concrete 
individual styles could be objects too. Sometimes administrative borders between 
states coincide with natural boundary, such as a river, while sometimes they are 
merely conventional—but they are no less real in this latter case. (36) The existence 
of such social facts indeed should not be controversial and their nature and 
functioning has been comprehensively analysed by John Searle in his The  ranko  itro i         A realist theory of art history 
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Construction of Social Reality. Verstegen’s approach is to introduce ‘methodological 
institutionalism’—as opposed to both methodological individualism and holism. 5 
He describes methodological institutionalism as the  iew ‘that there are societal 
facts that are supervenient above individuals and that society is composed of 
societal facts, not indi iduals’. (61) In other words, indi iduals are excluded from 
the constitution of society, while the difference between this position and 
methodological holism (the view that only collectives are real, while the existence of 
individuals is derivative from their membership of a group), hinges on the meaning 
of the critical word ‘super enes’. This means, Verstegen explains, that societal facts 
‘pro ide a superstructure to a society that persists while indi iduals come and go’. 
(61) While the USA Congress ‘depends for its existence on the existence of its 
members, it is also greater than them. When a congressman dies, his position does 
not. There are rules for the replacement of members, which continue to populate the 
group’. (61) Verstegen further infers that cultural objects similarly rely upon 
indi iduals for their creation, but once in existence, they ‘tend to acquire a life on 
their own’. (62) He relies on David Hall, Michael Ghiselin and Jonathan Gilmore in 
order to relativize the concept of an individual. A biological species need not be 
seen as a class of entities of which individual beings are members; what humans are 
is then defined via certain causal connections with other human beings. (67) Artistic 
styles (as well as philosophy, technology and so on) could then also be regarded as 
individuals: impressionism is an event and individual impressionist artists are its 
parts. (67)  
It would be interesting to know how Verstegen’s position differs from that of 
early-twentieth century German historicism: Ernst Troeltsch, in Der Historismus und 
seine Probleme, talked about collectives as individuals while for Friedrich Meinecke 
the historicist ‘indi idualising way of thinking’ consisted in treating groups and 
                                                        
5 For the distinction between holism and individualism see for instance Ernest Gellner, ‘Holism  ersus 
Indi idualism in History and Sociology’ in Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History, Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1959, 489-503, 491. Individualism  
 
does not wish to allow that the Whole could ever be a cause, and [insists] that explanations 
which make [it] appear that it is can be translated into other. … The holistic counter-argument 
works in reverse; if something (a) is a causal factor and (b) cannot be reduced, then in some 
sense it ‘really and independently exists’. 
 
Similarly J. W. N. Watkins, ‘Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences’ in Gardiner, Theories of 
History, 503-515, 505 describes the individualist position as the view that 
 
we shall not have arrived at rock-bottom explanations of such large-scale phenomena until we 
have reduced an account of them to statements about the dispositions, resources and inter-
relations of individuals. 
 
On the holist view, however, 
 
social systems constitute ‘wholes’ at least in the sense that some of their large-scale behaviour 
is governed by macro-laws which are essentially sociological in the sense that they are sui 
generis and not to be explained as mere regularities or tendencies resulting form the behaviour 
of interacting individuals.  
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collectives as historical individuals irreducible to biographical humans. 6 Verstegen 
likens styles to societies in the sense that both are made up of individuals (humans 
or artworks). He then says that ‘one can affirm the existence of both a society and a 
style based on their effects, which are not possible with the summed behaviour of a 
number of people or artworks’. (68) Causation, as mentioned earlier, is really the 
crucial issue: if institutions do not have effects that are irreducible to the effects of 
the actions of the individual humans which constitute them, then methodological 
institutionalism will collapse into indi idualism. Verstegen’s cryptic, se en lines 
long justification of his position is to introduce  (what de facto amounts to) the 
Aristotelian theory of causes, and propose that ‘it is possible’ to treat relationships 
between people and artworks as material causes; structures binding them would be 
formal causes and this would still lea e ‘people’ (presumably, human indi iduals) 
as the efficient causes. (68) When he then says that ‘This gets at the ‘producti e’ 
power of institutions without granting them efficient existence’ (69), one can only be 
puzzled about how (in what sense) institutions can be ‘producti e’ without being 
efficient causes? More profoundly, one cannot avoid Aristotelian metaphysics if one 
de facto relies on the Aristotelian theory of causes and, since modern science does not 
operate with material and formal causes but reduces all causation to efficient causes, 
the introduction of material and formal causation requires the wholesale rejection of 
modern scientific worldview. Arguably, this is a huge step to take in order to save 
the concept of style, which can be anyhow saved probably by other, less heroic, 
means. Vice-versa, if the material and formal causation that Verstegen postulates 
can be reduced to efficient causes, then we are back to individualism.  
Erwin Panofsky pointed out that the individualism-holism dilemma in 
historiography is inseparable from the metaphysical dilemma about free will.7 If one 
admits that human beings have free will (or merely admits that free will is an 
irresolvable metaphysical dilemma) then one cannot say that the actions of historical 
figures were determined and can be explained by membership of the collectives 
they belonged to. More generally, one can never state why individuals did the 
things they did, for they could have opted to act differently. Rather, one can 
describe what enabled and motivated their actions. Efficient causality and 
responsibility in the realm of social actions in that case rest firmly in the hands of 
human individuals—and there is no other kind of causation. There are only beliefs, 
motivations, wills, decisions and actions of individuals. Consider again an 
institution such as the USA Congress. It is certainly not constituted by a specific 
group of congressmen and it does not cease to exist when their time in office expires. 
Institutions exist as relationships between the actions of participating individuals, 
                                                        
6 Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Erstes Buch: Das logische Problem der 
Geschichtsphilosophie, Tu bingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1922, 32-33 and also 120: ‘‘Individuell’ bedeutet hier nicht 
den Gegensatz gegen Gesellschaft oder Typus oder Masse oder Gesamtzusammenhang, sondern den 
Gegensatz gegen die Abstraktheit des allgemeinen Gesetzes, also die Einmaligkeit, 
Unwiederholbarkeit und Besonderheit der historischen Gegensta nde, mo gen sie nun eine Epoche, eine 
Kulturtendenz, einen Staat, ein Volk, Massenzusta nde, Klassenrichtungen oder eine einzelne Person 
betreffen.’ For  einecke see his Die Entstehung des Historismus, Munich: Leibniz Verlag, 1946, 5 and 50 
as well as Walter Hoffer, Geschichtsschreibung und Weltanschauung; Betrachtungen zum Werk Friedrich 
Meineckes, Munich: Oldenburg, 1950, 66. 
7 Erwin Panofsky, ‘The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline’, in Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the 
Visual Arts, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1955, 1-25.  ranko  itro i         A realist theory of art history 
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and it is the beliefs, wills and motivations of these participating individuals (not 
only congressmen, but also voters, typists, librarians and so on) that keep the 
institution going through their actions. The word ‘Congress’ refers to the totality of 
these beliefs, wills and actions. The rules for the replacement of congressmen and 
their implementation, have no existence apart from the thoughts, beliefs, 
motivations and actions of these participating individuals: if all individual voters 
decided to boycott the elections, the institution could not continue to exist. Similar 
reasoning applies to artistic styles: they result from interaction between artists, 
patrons and everyone else who contributes. For instance, the changes in printing 
technology that enabled the printing of architectural details contributed 
substantially to the codification of the classical orders in the late Renaissance. 
After many years of dogmatic anti-realism, Verstegen’s book is an important 
and brave breakthrough in the philosophy of art history. The problems it formulates 
are going to stay with us in the years to come. It is likely that they point in the 
direction of future debates in the field. One would have appreciated if the book 
were more approachable (especially for postgraduate art history students) and its 
ideas slightly more elaborated. Insofar as one wants to see the field of art history 
liberated from the remnants of the ideologies that have done so much harm to 
scholarship in recent decades, clarity and accessibility are of paramount importance.    
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